Book Image

Defending APIs

By : Colin Domoney
Book Image

Defending APIs

By: Colin Domoney

Overview of this book

Along with the exponential growth of API adoption comes a rise in security concerns about their implementation and inherent vulnerabilities. For those seeking comprehensive insights into building, deploying, and managing APIs as the first line of cyber defense, this book offers invaluable guidance. Written by a seasoned DevSecOps expert, Defending APIs addresses the imperative task of API security with innovative approaches and techniques designed to combat API-specific safety challenges. The initial chapters are dedicated to API building blocks, hacking APIs by exploiting vulnerabilities, and case studies of recent breaches, while the subsequent sections of the book focus on building the skills necessary for securing APIs in real-world scenarios. Guided by clear step-by-step instructions, you’ll explore offensive techniques for testing vulnerabilities, attacking, and exploiting APIs. Transitioning to defensive techniques, the book equips you with effective methods to guard against common attacks. There are plenty of case studies peppered throughout the book to help you apply the techniques you’re learning in practice, complemented by in-depth insights and a wealth of best practices for building better APIs from the ground up. By the end of this book, you’ll have the expertise to develop secure APIs and test them against various cyber threats targeting APIs.
Table of Contents (19 chapters)
1
Part 1: Foundations of API Security
6
Part 2: Attacking APIs
10
Part 3: Defending APIs

Conducting threat modeling of APIs

Another advantage of a shift-left approach to API development is that it allows security and development teams to participate in joint threat modeling activities. While a detailed description of threat modeling is beyond the scope of this book, the concept is a simple one (from the Threat Modeling Manifesto):

  1. What are we working on?
  2. What can go wrong?
  3. What are we going to do about it?
  4. Did we do a good enough job?

The value of threat modeling is best demonstrated with an example. Let us revisit the vulnerability affecting the website of a global shipping company covered in Chapter 4. The website developers made three basic errors in their design:

  • They relied on security by obscurity by returning a map image—the researchers were able to get an exact postcode from the maps by searching the street names
  • They did not rate-limit their tracking-query endpoint, which allowed the researchers to guess the parcel...