Book Image

Mastering Malware Analysis

By : Alexey Kleymenov, Amr Thabet
Book Image

Mastering Malware Analysis

By: Alexey Kleymenov, Amr Thabet

Overview of this book

With the ever-growing proliferation of technology, the risk of encountering malicious code or malware has also increased. Malware analysis has become one of the most trending topics in businesses in recent years due to multiple prominent ransomware attacks. Mastering Malware Analysis explains the universal patterns behind different malicious software types and how to analyze them using a variety of approaches. You will learn how to examine malware code and determine the damage it can possibly cause to your systems to ensure that it won't propagate any further. Moving forward, you will cover all aspects of malware analysis for the Windows platform in detail. Next, you will get to grips with obfuscation and anti-disassembly, anti-debugging, as well as anti-virtual machine techniques. This book will help you deal with modern cross-platform malware. Throughout the course of this book, you will explore real-world examples of static and dynamic malware analysis, unpacking and decrypting, and rootkit detection. Finally, this book will help you strengthen your defenses and prevent malware breaches for IoT devices and mobile platforms. By the end of this book, you will have learned to effectively analyze, investigate, and build innovative solutions to handle any malware incidents.
Table of Contents (18 chapters)
Free Chapter
1
Section 1: Fundamental Theory
3
Section 2: Diving Deep into Windows Malware
5
Unpacking, Decryption, and Deobfuscation
9
Section 3: Examining Cross-Platform Malware
13
Section 4: Looking into IoT and Other Platforms

Modifying SSDT in an x64 environment

In the x64 environment, Windows implemented more protection from patching SSDT. Initially, SSDT hooking was used by malware and anti-malware products alike. It was also used by sandboxes and other behavioral antivirus tools. However, in 64-bit version, Microsoft decided to stop this completely and began offering legitimate applications other alternatives rather than SSDT hooking.

Microsoft implemented multiple protections to stop SSDT hooking, such as PatchGuard (which we will talk about later in this chapter). Additionally, it stopped exporting KeServiceDescriptorTable via ntoskrnl.exe.

Since KeServiceDescriptorTable is not exported, malware families started to search for functions that used this table in order to gain access to the addresses. One of the functions they used was KiSystemServiceRepeat.

This function contains the following code:

lea r10, <KeServiceDescriptorTable>
lea r11, <KeServiceDescriptorTableShadow>
test DWORD PTR ...