Book Image

Windows APT Warfare

By : Sheng-Hao Ma
5 (2)
Book Image

Windows APT Warfare

5 (2)
By: Sheng-Hao Ma

Overview of this book

An Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a severe form of cyberattack that lies low in the system for a prolonged time and locates and then exploits sensitive information. Preventing APTs requires a strong foundation of basic security techniques combined with effective security monitoring. This book will help you gain a red team perspective on exploiting system design and master techniques to prevent APT attacks. Once you’ve understood the internal design of operating systems, you’ll be ready to get hands-on with red team attacks and, further, learn how to create and compile C source code into an EXE program file. Throughout this book, you’ll explore the inner workings of how Windows systems run and how attackers abuse this knowledge to bypass antivirus products and protection. As you advance, you’ll cover practical examples of malware and online game hacking, such as EXE infection, shellcode development, software packers, UAC bypass, path parser vulnerabilities, and digital signature forgery, gaining expertise in keeping your system safe from this kind of malware. By the end of this book, you’ll be well equipped to implement the red team techniques that you've learned on a victim's computer environment, attempting to bypass security and antivirus products, to test its defense against Windows APT attacks.
Table of Contents (17 chapters)
1
Part 1 – Modern Windows Compiler
5
Part 2 – Windows Process Internals
9
Part 3 – Abuse System Design and Red Team Tips

Relocation table of PE

In the previous chapters, we assumed that executable files must be mounted on the image base expected by the compiler. However, in the following cases, we may need to mount the PE module on an image base that is not expected at the time of compilation:

  • There must be multiple mounted PE modules in a single process (regardless of EXE or DLL) and it is obvious that the common 0x400000 image address cannot be chosen for each DLL module during compilation.

Therefore, Microsoft designed relocation for PE, which is used to solve the challenge of mapping a PE module to an unexpected image base.

  • In the Calling programs directly in memory section of Chapter 5, we encountered a similar problem with the application loader that we tried to replicate. Since the application loader is already mapped to 0x400000, it is no longer possible to mount the EXE file on the occupied 0x400000 memory.
  • With the Service Pack 2 (SP2) patch, Windows XP provides Address...